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Financial Institutions
I. INTRODUCTION:
Data aggregation has been a hot topic in the financial
industry since First Union's December 1999 suit against Secure
Commerce Services.! Data aggregation is the process of gathering
information from multiple websites and delivering it to a consumer
on a single website.2 There are essentially two ways for an
aggregator to gather information-direct feed and screen
scraping? Both methods require a customer to create on-line
account access with the institutions they want on their single
website.4 The customer then turns over their account numbers,
I.D. numbers and passwords to their selected aggregator.5
1. First Union Alleges Online Payment Service Used Bank Customers'
Information Illegally, B.N.A., Feb. 1, 2000, at 2437 (citing First Union Corp v. Secure
Com. Serv., Inc., No. 3:99CV519H (W.D.N.C. filed Dec. 30, 1999)). Secure
Commerce Services, Inc., headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey, lets customers see
their bank account information and pay their bills through its Paytrust website. Carol
Power, First Union Confirms It Is Suing a 'Screen Scraper,' AM. BANKER, Jan. 19,
2000, at 5. The company gathers customers' financial information directly from the
websites of other companies at the request of its customers. Id.
2. Terms of Confusion, A.B.A. BANKING J., Jul. 2000, at 54. Financial
institutions are not the only entities concerned about data aggregation. In January
2000, eBay sued two sites that scraped its site. See Thomas P. Vartanian & Robert H.
Ledig, Scrape It, Scrub it and Show It: The Battle Over Data Aggregation, at
http://www.ffhsj.combancmail/bmarts/abaart.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2001) (citing
eBay, Inc. v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc., No. C-00-20023RMW (EAI) (N.D. Cal. Filed
Jan. 6, 2000); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge Inc., No. C-99-21200RMW (ENE) (N.D.
Cal. Filed Jan. 14,2000)).
3. Star Systems, Inc., Web Aggregation White Paper (Aug. 2000), at
http://www.star-system.com/news-corpresearch.html, at 1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2001)
[hereinafter Star Survey]. Star Systems, Inc. commissioned SWR Worldwide (SWR)
to conduct a survey of online consumers to gauge knowledge and awareness of web
aggregation services. Id. at 26. Between June 26 and July 17, 2000, SWR did an
online survey of 705 consumers nationwide who had previously expressed an interest
in online banking. Id. Respondents were invited by e-mail to visit the SWR web site
to take the survey; each respondent was granted a one-time access to the survey. Id.
The survey has an overall margin of error of 3.7% at a 95% confidence level. Id.
4. See Vartanian & Ledig, supra note 2.
5. See id.
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Direct feed involves an agreement between the aggregator
and the originating financial institution where the institution
transmits the account information to the aggregator, who then
makes the information available to the account holder on the
aggregator's web site.' Unfortunately, direct data feed access by
the aggregators places a huge demand on a financial institution's
computer system, which could have a harmful effect on the
system's speed and possibly cause a system to crash.' On the
positive side, direct data feeds involve an added level of security,
such as authentication and data encryption, and so the feeds are
less subject to fraud than screen scraping.8
The second method, screen scraping, was the method that
originally alarmed First Union.9 This method of aggregation does
not require an agreement between the aggregator and the financial
institution. 0 Because the screen-scraping aggregator has all of the
information an actual account holder would have, it gains access to
the same screen of data that the true account holder would see and
is electronically indistinguishable from the account holder.1 Other
6. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 4. Open Financial Exchange, based on the widely
accepted computer standard XML (extensible markup language) is the most common
communication protocol used by financial institutions and third party aggregators. Id.
That standard may change. See infra notes 134- 35 and accompanying text.
7. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 9; Lauren Bielski, Aggregators- AKA
"Screenscrapers," A.B.A. BANKING J., May 2000, at 47. Currently, the population of
web aggregation at any given institution is not great enough for this to be a real
concern. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 9. Additionally, many direct feeds are now
done in batches overnight when demand on computer systems is relatively low. Id. at
9-10. Direct feeds done overnight, however, seem to have the same drawbacks
involved with stale information a screen scraping method might have. See infra notes
138-143 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, as the number of aggregation
customers grows into the millions and more customers require up to the minute
account information, the demand that direct feeds place on financial institutions'
computer systems is expected to explode. Id. at 10.
8. See First Union Alleges Online Payment Service Used Bank Customers'
Information Illegally, supra note 1. Paradoxically, direct feeds may entail greater
liability to participating financial institutions than does screen-scraping precisely
because accessing data with direct feed requires their full knowledge and
cooperation. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 10.
9. First Union Alleges Online Payment Service Used Bank Customers'
Information Illegally, supra note 1, at 2437 (quoting First Union Corp v. Secure Com.
Serv., Inc., No. 3:99CV519H (W.D.N.C. filed Dec. 30, 1999)).
10. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 5.
11. Id. It is hard, if not impossible, to tell who is signed on- the customer, an
aggregator, or a thief with the customer's name and password. Miriam Leuchter,
Aggregation Aggravation, U.S. BANKER, Oct. 2000, at 32.
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risks associated with outside screen scraping include the potential
security risk created when user names, account numbers and
passwords are stored on the aggregator's servers. 2 In addition, the
screen scraping aggregator's visit to a bank's web site may
overload the institution's hardware, leading to delays and
performance issues. 3  Problems also arise when a financial
institution changes the design of its web site or screen. The design
changes often make it difficult for the screen-scraping software to
locate specific data- raising problems with inaccurate or
incomplete data."
In First Union's December 1999 suit, the complaint alleged
that Paytrust, a screen-scraping website, illegally lifted customer
information off its website.15 First Union specifically alleged that
Paytrust "secretly accessed the First Union Website...
misrepresented its relationship with the bank, violated trademark
and copyright law, and misled customers on the safety of their
information, among other charges."'" The parties settled the suit in
March 2000, but many of the security concerns involved in
12. Jerry Minkoff, Banking: Banks Face Loss of Customers to Account
Aggregators, WEB FIN., Apr. 10, 2000, 2000 WL 4044340. When asked who the
consumer thought would be responsible if someone gained unauthorized access to
their information and omitted fraud, 75% said they thought the third-party Internet
company offering the web aggregation service would be responsible. Star Survey,
supra note 3.
13. Star Survey, supra note 3.
14. Id. at 9. In many instances, aggregators collect account data once a day,
meaning the information available at their web sites is updated only once every
twenty-four hours. Id.
15. First Union Alleges Online Payment Service Used Bank Customers'
Information Illegally, supra note 1, at 2437. In December 1999, First Union also
announced requirements for aggregator companies in an effort to address customer
and privacy concerns. First Union Announces Internet Requirements for Aggregator
Companies in an Effort to Address Customer Service and Privacy Concerns, at
http://personalfinance.firstunion.com/pf/press/item/0,2907,228,00.html (last visited
Oct. 30, 2000). The requirements include: that First Union be able to identify and
track aggregated transactions on its website; aggregators can only make inquiries, not
initiate transactions on behalf of First Union customers; aggregators must sign a
binding contractual agreement to consolidate the information in a way that protects
its confidential nature; aggregators must provide end-to-end audit trails at the system
and transactional level; and, aggregators must agree to adhere to privacy standards.
Ross Snel, First Union Lays Down Guidelines for 'Screen Scrapers' Culling Its Site,
AM. BANKER, Jan. 12,2000, at 1.
16. First Union Alleges Online Payment Service Used Bank Customers'
Information Illegally, supra note 1, at 2437 (quoting First Union Corp v. Secure
Commerce Services Inc., W.D.N.C., No. 3:99CV-519-P, 12130199).
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aggregation still linger- especially regulatory oversight."'
According to Gayle Wellborn of First Union, "[n]on-financial
companies don't have the same regulatory oversight (as banks)."'"
Days before announcing it was dropping the suit, First Union
announced: "We support aggregation. We want to be aggregators,
but we want to be sure that we do it in a way that safeguards our
customers."19 In the year following First Union's suit much has
changed in the industry. First Union plans to introduce an account
aggregation service driven by Yodlee, Inc?° in the second half of
2001.1
First Union is not alone among financial institutions in its
warming relationship with screen scraping. In July 2000,
Citigroup, Inc. launched its aggregation site, myciti.com using
Paytrust data aggregation technology.' Customers and non-
customers can view accounts they hold with any institution at
myciti.com and can aggregate their e-mail and frequent flier miles
at the site.' In October 2000, Citibank also became one of the first
17. Karen Kroll, Behind the Account Aggregation Stir, FIN. SERV. ONLINE, Sep.
2000, at 16.
18. Id. (quoting Gayle F. Wellborn, director of customer advocacy with First
Union).
19. Jessica Toonkel, First Union Yields to Screen Scraping, AM. BANKER, Apr. 13,
2000 (quoting Kellie Scott, First Union Senior Vice President and e-Channels
Director).
20. Yodlee.com is a privately held technology company based in Sunnyvale, CA.
Founded in 1999, it has already emerged as one of the biggest players in account
aggregation. John Hackett, Domesticating Account Aggregators, BANK TECH. NEWS,
Oct. 2000, at 1.
21. Megan J. Ptacek, Aggregation Standard-Setter 1" Union Downplays Service,
AM. BANKER, Jan. 2, 2001, at 1. First Union says it supports account aggregation, but
does not engage in screen scraping, either on its own or through vendors.
Clarification, AM. BANKER, Apr. 14,2000, at 12.
22. Carol Power, Citi Advances in Online Payments, Aggregation, AM. BANKER,
Jul. 19, 2000 [hereinafter Power, Citi Advances]. As part of the online payment
program, Citigroup pays AOL for every new customer it signs through AOL's portal.
Id. Myciti.com has already attracted fifty thousand customers, 11% of whom are new
to Citigroup. Carol Power, Citi Deploys Its Web Troops Into Business Lines, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 1, 2000, at I [hereinafter Power, Citi Deploys].
23. Power, Citi Advances, supra note 22; Power, Citi Deploys, supra note 22, at 1.
As part of its cross-selling efforts, the site also offers one-stop shopping for Citigroup
products, including Citibank banking, loans, mortgages, and credit cards; Salomon
Smith Barney brokerage and investment products; and Travelers insurance products.
Id. It also offers financial calculators and, among other things, enables customers to
work out repayments on car loans. Id.
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banking companies to offer online bill presentment.24 Chase
Manhattan Bank has chosen an alternate route by only allowing
Chase customers to access its aggregation site.' Centura Banks,
Inc. uses VerticalOne Corp to offer aggregation.' Centura
Snapshot offers to "bring together all of your accounts - including
credit cards, investments, checking and savings, bills, travel
rewards and email - together on one convenient, secure page with
one security key to remember. '
The original data aggregation services provided by Internet
companies like Yodlee or Corillian have mostly become the
supporting technology for aggregators, whether those aggregators
are banks, portal? or investment firms.29 Moreover, in a sign that
the industry is surely maturing, Yodlee and VerticalOne Corp, a
subsidiary of rival S1 CORP, are merging.' The merged entity will
aggregate about 1.5 million accounts from 425,000 customers; it
24. Carol Power, Citi Jumps into Online Bill Presentment, AM. BANKER, Oct. 16,
2000 at 1. Many banks have Internet based programs that allow people to pay bills
through the Internet, but few banks present bills this way. Id. The payment system
is called C2it. Citi Deploys, supra note 22, at 1.
25. Chase Online Plus, at http://www.chase.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2001) (click
on the "Personal" icon; on the next page click on "learn more" under the "Chase
Online" icon).
26. Centura Snapshot, at http://www.centura.com/whatsonline/snapshot.cfm?
TargetURL=https://secure.verticalone.comlimages/Centuralresourcesllearnmore.htm
1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2001).
27. Id.
28. "A portal is a web site that mixes content and utilitarian features to attract
users on a mass scale, which sets it apart from a specialized web site geared to a niche
audience." Julie Monahan, Portal Puzzle, BANKING STRATEGIES, Nov. 1999/Dec.
1999, at 148. Most of the major portal sites such as Yahoo! and AOL started as
search engines. Id.
29. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 4. Yodlee offers "a consolidated, summarized
view of a user's personal account information and enables users to view updated
snapshots of all recent account activities in one place." Yodlee for the Web, at
http://www.yodlee.com/solutions/yodleeforweb.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2000). It
has been suggested that financial advisors should be wary of aggregation. Frederick
P. Gabriel, Jr., Online Account Aggregation Could Hurt Advisors, INv. NEws, Oct. 2,
2000, at 1. If a client can aggregate a complete financial picture on his own, it could
eliminate the role advisors play in assembling a complete picture of a client's
financial well-being. Id. Citigroup, Chase, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley
indicate that they intend to analyze clients' financial needs and suggest investments
using data gathered through account aggregation. Winning Duo: Aggregation Plus
Advice, AM. BANKER, Oct. 4,2000, at 1 [hereinafter Winning Duo].
30. Top 'Screen-Scrapers' Agree Merger, RETAIL BANKER INT'L, Dec. 12,2000, at
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will have eighty-eight banking and other customers, including
Yahoo!, AOL, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Chase Manhattan and
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter."
Despite the increasing use of screen scraping technology by
financial institutions security concerns remain, and each institution
has taken various approaches to privacy, security, and liability. 2
Financial institutions used varying approaches for deciding
whether or how to transfer or sell customer information to third
parties so that those third parties could market products and
services to the customer base.3 Pending guidelines on the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) may lessen the variety of approaches.'
How regulation will or should affect the development of
online financial management and aggregation is still not very clear,
even with the additional guidelines. This Note will begin with a
discussion of why financial institutions became interested in
offering account aggregation." Then, it will discuss the effect of
privacy regulations on aggregating financial institutions and
authority for those institutions to conduct such business." Next, it
31. Id. Competitor uMonitor, Inc. of Germantown, Tennessee denounced the
merger on antitrust grounds. Tech Scene: Yodlee's Deal Raises Stakes for Little Guys,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 13, 2000, at 1.
32. Renee Boucher Ferguson, Data Aggregation Poses Risks, EWEEK, Oct. 2,
2000, at 44. Yahoo sets a $1000 limit on its liability; officials from Citigroup said the
bank would cover money lost to an aggregator, although they did not say how much.
Id. Wells Fargo promises 100% coverage for any funds improperly removed while
they are handling the transaction, including online theft of account numbers or
passwords and unauthorized removal of funds from the account. Wells Fargo Online
Banking Guarantee, at http:llwww.wellsfargo.comlper/services/security.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2001). In a typical user acceptance agreement, VerticalOne promises
"not to sell, exchange, or release your Personal Information or your Login
Information to a third party without your express permission, unless required by
appropriate legal processes, such as a judicial or administrative order." Centura
Snapshot Privacy Policy, at http:lwww.centura.comlwhatsonline/snapshot.cfm? (last
visited Oct. 30, 2000) (linking to VerticalOne privacy policy and User Acceptance
Agreement). The agreement also states, "you expressly agree that under no
circumstances shall VerticalOne's total liability to you or any party claiming by,
through or under you for any cause whatsoever, and regardless of the form of action,
whether in contract or in tort, including negligence or strict liability, in the aggregate,
exceed $1,000 (U.S.)." Id.
33. John L. Douglas, Cyberbanking: Legal and Regulatory Considerations for
Banking Organizations, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 57,124 (2000).
34. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 1069-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). See
infra notes 38 - 53 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 54- 91 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 92- 119 and accompanying text.
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will discuss how third party aggregators may be regulated,
including the application of Regulation E. Finally, this note will
explore the issues financial institutions need to be concerned with
when providing aggregation services: security, privacy, and fraud
protection.'
II. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS' INCREASED INTEREST
IN PROVIDING DATA AGGREGATION:
Financial institutions became interested in offering data
aggregation services because consumers wanted to aggregate their
financial lives. According to a Star System survey, 65% of online
consumers believe that they will make all or most of their financial
transactions online five years from now.' Prior studies estimated
that between 400,000 to 800,000 people would be using
aggregation services by the end of 2000." Long-term predictions
have motivated financial institutions to move far more quickly
than normal.' U.S. Bankcorp Piper Jaffray, for example, predicts
the number of aggregation users will hit 90 million over the next
37. See infra notes 120 - 150 and accompanying text.
38. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 6. Twenty-two percent believe they will make all
of their financial transactions online, and 43% believe they will make most of their
financial transactions online. Id.
39. There is no real consensus as to the number of people currently using
aggregation; estimates range from 100,000 current users to over 1 million. See
Jeremy Quittner, Consumers Show Interest in Aggregation, AM. BANKER, Sep. 27,
2000, at 8A (citing to U.S. Bankcorp Piper Jaffray) (with 1 million user estimate);
Hackett, supra note 20, at 1 (estimating current usage at about half a million); Banks
Look Forward to Becoming Aggregators, RETAIL DELIVERY NEws, Apr. 26, 2000, at
9 (citing to a "Account Aggregators, Screen Scrapers and Online Financial Services"
report from Celent Communications) (estimating in April 2000 that about 100,000
users made use of aggregation services); Megan J. Ptacek, Aggregation Pits Banks
Against Web Portals, AM. BANKER, Dec. 8,2000, at 1 (estimating 3.1 million users by
2003).
40. Lauri Geisen, The Great Data Roundup, FIN. SERV. ONLINE, Oct. 2000, at 38.
"With most banking technologies, it takes about four years to get a
new technology into the market... [i]t historically takes a year for
most banks to figure it out, a year to try to stop it, a year to
recognize they can't stop it and a year to do it. With aggregation,
many institutions have gone from recognizing what it is and what it
can do for them to implementation in about four months[.]"
Id. (quoting Mathew Cone, chief marketing officer for Corillian Corp).
2001]
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five years.4' When asked if they would like to have online access to
all of their financial accounts through a central web site,
approximately half of the respondents to an American
Banker/Gallup Consumer Survey responded positively.42 Of those
who expressed an interest in online account aggregation, 43% said
they would be more interested if their primary financial institution
provided the service, and 52% said it would make no difference.43
A trend is developing, as aggregation technology and use
matures, of giving consumers the capability to transfer funds
among accounts and to third parties.' 4 However, as aggregation
moves toward offering real-time transactional capabilities,
consumer protection issues such as privacy, security, accuracy, and
fraud prevention will become increasingly important and
complex.45 More and more types of accounts are being aggregated,
with insurance and real estate information becoming available
alongside data from banks, credit card companies, and brokerage
houses." Soon, consumers will be able to receive financial advice
based on aggregated account information, purchase financial
products, and transfer money electronically between accounts and
to third parties. Experts predict that future software will be able
41. Leuchter, supra note 11, at 29 (citing U.S. Bankcorp Piper Jaffray's senior
eFinance analyst, Stephen Franco).
42. Quittner, supra note 39, at 8A. Twenty-one percent were "very" interested,
and 28% were "somewhat" interested. Id. It should be noted that 49% were "not
interested." Id. Among those who own computers, the "very interested" numbers
rose to 26%; for current online banking customers, those numbers rose to 35%. Id.
43. Id. Only 5% said they would be less interested if their bank provided the
service. Id. A November 1999 survey by Gomez Advisors found that 45% of active
web bankers who transact online at least once a month are not interested in
consolidating their accounts with one financial services provider. It's Brand that
Claims a Category, FuTuRE BANKER, May 2000, at 25S. But the numbers vary. In a
study done in June 2000, 89% of respondents ranked as important that the service be
"provided or supported by [their] current financial institution." Star Survey, supra
note 3, at 40 (57% ranked it as "very important" and 32% ranked it as "somewhat
important"). The same survey found that approximately two thirds believe that web
aggregation services offered by a financial institution provided greater security
(70%), privacy (69%), and fraud protection (65%) than similar services offered by
third-party Internet providers. Id. at 60-61.
44. Winning Duo, supra note 29, at 1.
45. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 1.
46. Id. Myciti.com offers the ability to check e-mail, airline miles, and travel
reservations. Myciticom Home Page, at http://www.myciti.com (last visited Feb. 21,
2001).
47. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 7.
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to evaluate customers' aggregated account information and, based
on their financial goals and risk tolerance, automatically reallocate
assets as needed to maximize value and return.4'
If consumers want to aggregate their financial lives onto
one web site and their financial institution is not providing the
service, the financial institution may be the one that loses. The
financial institution's brand name is less visible and fewer visits to
the site mean fewer opportunities to cross-sell financial products to
consumers.49 The longer a customer stays, the greater the cross-sell
potential." The hosting bank can address concerns about exposing
customers to competitors by establishing itself as a destination site
where customers spend most of their time." Aggregation
agreements may increase revenue, and the technology, perhaps in
conjunction with electronic bill presentment and payment, could
turn online banking into a 'must-have' service.52 Aggregation can
48. Id.
49. Minkoff, supra note 12 (citing to Celent Communications, Account
Aggregators, Screen Scrapers and Online Financial Services report). Cross-selling
need not be limited to financial products. Over the 2000 holiday season, several
major banks, including Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, and First Union, formed
partnerships with Internet retailers and begun promoting the merchants' goods on
bank-sponsored web sites. Deborah Bach, Banks Putting Brands On the Line with E-
Tail Pairings, AM. BANKER, Dec. 21, 2000, at 1. Chase said that it seeks to give
customers a convenient shopping experience that will promote Chase credit cards as
the payment instrument of choice. Id. Bank of America offers discounts for Bank of
America cardholders and guarantees safety. Id. Citibank tied a holiday promotion
to its new Click Citi credit card, which was designed expressly for online purchases.
Id.
50. Minkoff, supra note 12. However, the cross-sell potential is not limitless.
Jessica Toonkel, As Aggregation Gains, Doubt on Cross-Selling, AM. BANKER, Sep.
19,2000, at 1. Consumers indicated that they do not want to use account aggregation
if it will lead to a barrage of marketing messages about new products. Id. Focus
groups found that customers were against banner ads, targeted ads, and opt-in
marketing. Id.
51. Monahan, supra note 28, at 148.
52. John R. Engen, Financial Funnel, BANKING STRATEGIES, Nov. 2000/Dec.
2000, at 64. "Ultimately, this is a chance for Internet banking to finally boost the
bottom line...." Id. (quoting Octavio Marenzi, president of Celent
Communications). Internet-only banks may reap the greatest benefit from
aggregation services. Jessica Toonkel, Banks Stop Whining, Learn to Love
Aggregation, AM. BANKER, Sep. 8, 2000, at 3A [hereinafter Toonkel, Banks Stop
Whining]. Consumers who want to maintain a relationship with a traditional bank
often question if they can get all of their services from Internet-only banks. Id.
"Aggregation is a way we can allow them to maintain those relationships easily while
growing our own relationships." Id. (quoting D.R. Grimes, chief executive officer and
vice chairman of Atlanta-based NetBank).
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also make a financial institution's web site "sticky," because once
customers take the time to set up aggregation of their accounts,
they are not likely to go through the process again on another
site.53
III. EFFEcr OF PRIVACY REGULATIONS ON
AGGREGATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Among other things, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA)' establishes a minimum federal standard of financial
privacy, requiring written privacy policies and their disclosure to
customers, as well as providing an opportunity for consumers to
opt out of information sharing with a non-affiliate. ' Title V of
GLBA was enacted to provide a mechanism to protect the
confidentiality of a consumer's personal financial information and
give a consumer some power to choose how financial institutions
use that information, without undermining the benefits that will
result from enhanced affiliations and competition." Congress
believed the development of new technologies that facilitate
consumers' access to the broad range of products and services
53. Toonkel, Banks Stop Whining, supra note 52, at 3A.
54. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 1069-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
55. KENNETH R. BENSON, ET. AL, FINANCIAL SERVICES MODERNIZATION:
GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999, LAW AND EXPLANATION (1999), at 3. GLBA
permits the creation of new financial services holding companies that can offer a full
range of financial products under a strong regulatory-based regime. Id. It eliminates
legal barriers to affiliations among banks and securities firms, insurance companies,
and other financial services companies. Id. GLBA also provides financial
organizations with flexibility in structuring these new financial affiliations through a
holding company structure or a financial subsidiary with appropriate safeguards. Id.
Under GLBA, the Federal Reserve Board remains the umbrella supervisor for
holding companies and incorporates a system of functional regulation designed to
utilize the strengths of the various federal and state regulators. Id. It also creates a
system of coordination between the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the
Treasury for the approval of new financial activities for holding companies and
national bank financial subsidiaries. Id.
56. Gramm-Leach-Bliley §§ 501-527 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.); BENSON, supra note 55, at 3. Title V requires financial institutions to
develop practices to protect customers' information from unauthorized access, to
disclose to them in a clear, timely manner their policies for sharing information with
unaffiliated third parties, and to inform them of their right to refuse permission for
dissemination of certain types of data. 15 U.S.C. §6801-03 (Supp. V 1999). It also
forbids financial institutions from disclosing customers' account numbers to third
parties for marketing purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (Supp. V 1999).
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available through online media should be encouraged, provided
such technologies continue to incorporate safeguards for consumer
privacy
57
The aggregation companies may not have seen themselves
as falling under government oversight, but they seem to be coming
around." GLBA defines "financial institution" to mean any
institution engaged in financial activities as described in Section
4(k) of the Bank Holding Act of 1956."9 Those "financial
activities" include not only a number of traditional financial
activities specified in section 4(k) itself, but also those activities the
Federal Reserve Board (Fed) has found to be either closely
related to banking or usually in connection with the transaction of
banking or other financial operations abroad, by regulation (or
order or interpretation) "in effect on the date of the enactment of
the [GLBA]."'  Expressly included in certain circumstances is:
57. BENSON, supra note 55, at 99. Congress' belief seems to assume a certain
level of self-regulation. Id. While responsible aggregators are currently doing an
admirable job of this, there is no guarantee that they will continue to do so, or that
some rogue aggregator will not break the rules. Id.
58. Hackett, supra note 20, at 1. "It was a real wake-up call for some of these
technology providers when they first got involved with regulators and banks. The
aggregators discovered that they're treading in an area where we're going to be
looking at them." Id. (quoting Jennifer Dickerson, director, technology risk
management, at the Office of Thrift Supervision).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 6809 (Supp. V 1999). Section 4(k) is codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1843(k)(4) (Supp. V 1999) and states:
[T]he following activities shall be considered to be financial in
nature:
(A) Lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or
safeguarding money or securities.
(B) Insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying against loss, harm,
damage, illness, disability, or death, or providing and issuing
annuities, and acting as principal, agent, or broker for purposes of
the foregoing, in any State.
(C) Providing financial, investment, or economic advisory services,
including advising an investment company (as defined in section 3
of the Investment Company Act of 194)).
(D) Issuing or selling instruments representing interests in pools of
assets permissible for a bank to hold directly.
(E) Underwriting, dealing in, or making a market for securities.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(A) - (E) (Supp. V 1999).
60. Id. The Fed's list of such activities is found in 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 and 12
C.F.R. § 225.86(a) (2000). The FTC interprets GLBA to refer to those activities in
section 4(k) that are described as financial in nature at present, and not automatically
to include those activated that the Federal Reserve Board later determines are
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"providing financial data processing and transmission services,
facilities (including hardware, software, documentation, or
operating personnel), data bases, advice, or access to these by
technological means."'" Thus, it appears that financial institutions
and their aggregators fall under GLBA.
GLBA lists the various categories of "financial institutions
and other persons" subject to Title V and specifies their respective
regulators.' After detailing the respective regulators for brokers,
insurance companies, and various categories of banks, section 505
assigns responsibility for "any other financial institution or other
person" to the Federal Trade Commission.' The Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) has taken the position that aggregation
technology companies providing services to institutions fall within
the agency's jurisdiction.' "The concept of 'financial institution' is
a very significant concept and may be interpreted somewhat
differently depending on which regulatory agency you're dealing
with[.]"'  The Fed is responsible for Regulation E, the regulation
that governs electronic fund transfers.' It has not formally
weighed in on whether or not aggregators would be considered
financial institutions, but as the discussion later in this paper
indicates, it is possible that the Fed could construe the regulation
that way. However, commentators on the Privacy of Consumer
Financial Information rules set forth by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) requested clarification concerning whether
certain Internet industries are affected by the rule.' In its final
rule, the FTC noted that institutions operating on-line, like those
operating off-line, must evaluate whether they are engaged in a
incidental or complementary to financial activities. Id.
61. 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (2000).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a) (Supp. V 1999).
63. Id. (a)(7) (Supp. V 1999).
64. Hackett, supra note 20, at 1. The ruling by OTS is narrower than it first
appears; aggregators working independently of any financial institutions may or may
not be subject to regulation when offering their services directly to the public. Id.
65. Id. (quoting John Burke, outside counsel for BITS, the technology arm of the
Financial Services Technology Consortium).
66. Id.
67. The Fed will likely consider Internet aggregators to fall under federal
regulations. See infra notes 69-119 and accompanying text.
68. Electronic Fund Transfers, 65 Fed. Reg. 40,061 (June 29, 2000).
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financial activity, and if so, whether they have consumers or
customers that trigger the disclosure or other requirements of the
Act." The FTC specifically noted that the language of proposed
Regulation E brings into the definition of 'financial institution' "an
Internet company that compiles, or aggregates, an individual's on-
line accounts.., at that company's web site as a service to the
individual, who then may access all of its account information
through that Internet site."7
As for the relationship between aggregating companies
working for financial institutions, bankers should tread carefully,
since creating a principal-agent relationship between an aggregator
and a financial institution presents an opportunity for liability.
Commentators to privacy regulations proposed by the various
agencies agreed with the principle that an individual should not be
considered a consumer of an entity acting as agent for a financial
institution.7' Financial institutions should note that the financial
institution that hires the agent is responsible for that agent's
conduct in carrying out the agency activities; therefore, the
financial institution fulfills any obligations regarding the agent's
handling of consumer information that otherwise would fall on the
agents.' This concept is critical to banks entering the data
aggregation business. Banks could face possible liability through a
principal-agent relationship for any mishaps that occur through the
aggregator's fault.73 Further, whenever a third party contracts with
a depository institution to provide technology or services that
enable the institution to offer web aggregation, the law seems to
expect the third party to uphold specified safety and soundness
standards to protect the depository institution and its customers.
69. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,646,33,655 (May
24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 313). The FTC also notes that financial
software and hardware manufacturers, as described, are financial institutions but will
have no disclosure obligations if they sell only to businesses. Id.
70. Id. at 33,655.
71. Id. at 33,651.
72. Id. It is possible for two institutions to provide a financial service to the
consumer as part of the same transaction, such as a loan broker that locates a creditor
who makes a loan to the individual; in those situations, the consumer will have a
customer relationship with both financial institutions. Id.
73. See id.
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Financial institutions should also exercise care with respect
to the labyrinth of federal privacy safeguards.' Privacy provisions
do not apply to all consumer information; they apply only to so-
called 'non-public personal information.'76  GLBA defines
nonpublic personal information to mean "personally identifiable
financial information- (i) provided by a consumer to a financial
institution; [or] (ii) resulting from any transaction with the
consumer or any service performed for the consumer; or (iii)
[information] otherwise obtained by the financial institution."'
The final Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Fed, OTS and
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) rule states that:
"information will be deemed to be 'publicly available' and
therefore excluded from the definition of 'nonpublic personal
information' if a financial institution has a reasonable basis to
believe that the information is lawfully made available to the
general public from one of the three categories of sources listed in
the rule."'78 The joint final rule treats any information as personally
identifiable financial information if the consumer provides
information in order to obtain a financial product or service, or the
bank otherwise obtains the information in connection with
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(c) (Supp. V 1999).
Banks must understand how absolutely vital it is to choose a
reputable source for aggregation technology or services... [j]ust as
no bank would ever make a loan unless it had a loan officer that
understood credit risk, banks also must be sure that they have the
internal expertise necessary to evaluate and select reputable and
credible vendors. This is critical to their reputation and
responsibility to account holders.
Star Survey, supra note 3, at 19 (quoting Clifford A. Wilke, director of bank
technology at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency). See also Interagency
Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information and
Rescission of Year 2000 Standards for Safety and Soundness, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,616
(Feb. 1, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 211, 225, 263, 308, 364, 568, 570,
and 30) (establishing standards for safeguarding customer information under
GLBA).
75. David W. Roderer, Tentative Steps Toward Financial Privacy, 4 N.C.
BANKING INST. 209, 213 (2000).
76. Id.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
78. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,162 (June 1,
2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 216,332,573, and 40).
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providing a financial product or service to the consumer. 9 Further,
information obtained over the Internet will be considered publicly
available if it is lawfully made available on a site that is accessible
to the public on an unrestricted basis.' The FTC's final rule
considers information to be publicly available if a bank has a
reasonable basis to believe that the information is lawfully made
available to the general public from government records, widely
distributed media, or disclosures required by law.8
The full range of federal privacy safeguards does not apply
to information shared by financial institutions with either affiliates
or third-party providers and servicers of the institution.' A
consumer has no right to opt out of disclosure, but the bank must
satisfy certain requirements in order to qualify for the exception.'
First, before the bank shares the information, it must disclose to
the consumer that it will provide this information to the
nonaffiliated third party.' Second, the bank must enter into a
79. Id. at 35,171.
80. Id. at 35,172. A web site is not restricted merely because an Internet service
provider or a web site operator requires a fee or a password, so long as access is
available to the general public. Id. A site such as a 'look up' service, that makes
available personal information (that may combine publicly available ana confidential
information on a particular individual) compiled in response to a specific request, is
not available to the general public on an unrestricted basis. Id.
81. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,645,33,657 (May
24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 313). A bank may not assume that a
consumer's information is publicly available but must determine that the information
is of the type that is available to the general public and whether an individual can
direct that the information not be publicly available (for example, an unlisted
telephone number). Id. If an individual can take steps to prevent information from
being made publicly available, a bank must determine whether the consumer has
done so. Id
82. 15 U.S.C. §6802(b)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
83. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,162; Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,645, 33,657. Proposed Fair Credit
Reporting Act regulations would require financial institutions to send "opt-out"
forms to customers. Michele Heller, In Brief. Roundtable Knocks Privacy Opt-Out
Plan, AM. BANKER, Nov. 17, 2000, at 4. The fair credit proposal would require a
notice that details what information is being released, what kind of companies will
have access to the information, the customer's right to refuse to share the
information, and how someone would actually execute an opt-out. Id. The proposal
does not seem to distinguish between data sharing within the 'corporate family.' Id.
GLBA requires all customers be notified of a financial institution's privacy policies
and those that share data outside the corporate family must give customers an
opportunity to opt out of the information sharing. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Heller, supra note 83.
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contract with the third party that requires the third party to
maintain the confidentiality of the information.' The final rule
requires that the contract generally prohibit the third party from
disclosing or using the information other than to carry out the
purposes for which the information was disclosed.' The final rule
imposes no additional conditions for the availability of this
exception beyond those indicated in the statute.' If nonpublic
personal information is received under one of the above
exceptions, its use is also restricted.' The information can be
shared with affiliates of the financial institution from which the
information was obtained.' It can also be disclosed to the
receiving institution's affiliates, but those affiliates can only use the
information to the extent that the receiving institution has
disclosed or used the information.' The information can also be
disclosed in the ordinary course of business of carrying out the
activity covered by the exception under which the receiving
institution received the information.9
IV. REGULATING THIRD PARTY AGGREGATORS
Although consumers may not have specific knowledge
about all of the federal and state imposed controls placed on
depository institutions, these safeguards contribute to subtle




88. 16 CFR §313.11(a)(1)(2000) (FTC regulations).
89. Id.
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, a nonaffiliated third
party that receives from a financial institution nonpublic personal
information under this section shall not, directly or through an
affiliate of such receiving third party, disclose such information to
any other person that is a nonaffiliated third party of both the
financial institution and such receiving third party, unless such
disclosure would be lawful if made directly to such other person by
the financial institution.





confidence in the services the financial institutions provide.'
Ninety-two percent of Star survey respondents believe that all web
aggregators-third-party Internet providers as well as financial
institutions that offer web aggregation-"should be required to
comply with federal banking regulations."'  Significantly, 51% of
respondents assumed that third-party Internet companies "are
required to comply with federal banking regulations."'94 An
overwhelming majority also say they would be less likely to use
third-party providers if they knew that those providers "were not
required to comply with federal banking regulations."'
Amid the current regulatory uncertainties, the leading
third-party aggregators realize that ensuring consumer privacy and
security is vital, and many have instituted robust, comprehensive
security technologies and procedures.96 Aggregators have been
92. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 15. These safeguards include capital and reserve
requirements, review of board and senior management qualifications, deposit
insurance and regular governmental examinations. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. Eighty-nine percent said they would be less likely to use third-party
providers if not regulated by federal banking regulations. Id.
96. Id. Typical of the high level of security, Yodlee employs the following
security measures for its liaison with myciti.com: Twenty-four hour monitoring of the
physical site with access to servers requiring multiple levels of authentication,
including biometric (hand print scan); and, network infrastructure including firewalls,
intrusion detection, private addressing, sanitized systems, and Secure Socket Layer,
which creates an encrypted connection between the users browser and the
MyAccounts Web servers. Citigroup, Privacy / Security Policy, at https://myaccounts.
myciti.com/help/privacy.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2001). MyCiti.com also employs
regular audits and inspections by Ernst & Young (audits network and policy security)
and Security (audits network and Internet application security). Id. Citigroup and
Yodlee employ a fairly typical privacy statement, promising that they will ensure the
confidentiality of customer financial information by the following pledges:
* We will not sell or share your data with any third parties.
* We will not contact you or allow others to contact you without
your explicit permission (via opt-in on site), unless required for
customer service.
* We cannot view your usernames, passwords or any of your data
collected from other sites - this information is kept encrypted at all
times.
Id. The site also states that it will not share personal data with third parties "unless it
is required to be disclosed by law under a subpoena." Id. Some third-party
aggregators are members of the TRUSTe Program, an independent, nonprofit
initiative whose mission is to build users' trust and confidence in the Internet by
promoting the principles of disclosure and informed consent. Star Survey, supra note
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working hard to convince institutions and consumers that their
systems are safe and secure.9 Best practices for aggregators have
emerged, which include third-party audits, identification and
authentication systems, access-control procedures and incident
protection procedures.98 However, these safeguards are privately
enacted. Traditionally defined financial institutions are subject to
enforcement by traditional banking regulators, who examine them
on a regular, proactive basis.' If an independent aggregator falls
within the updated definition of 'financial institution' under
GLBA, it would appear that the aggregator is subject to FTC
enforcement."°  Once the FTC is involved, it moves swiftly,
aggressively, and publicly to investigate and penalize an
offender.' However, the FTC does not proactively audit or seek
out offenders as would traditional banking regulators."°
What happens when aggregators move away from offering
just account viewing and move into providing bill-paying or
money-transferring services? One potential way to regulate third
party aggregators that offer bill-paying services is through the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA)." Enacted in 1978, EFTA
3, at 21. However, the TRUSTe program is not perfect. In July, 2000, Columbus,
Ohio based Interhack Corp., a security firm that does risk assessment for Internet
retailers, reported that at least two websites that carried the TRUSTe privacy seal,
Lucy.com and Fusion.com, were sending personal information to the marketing
company Coremetrics. Rebecca Lynch, Analysis: E-Privacy Debates Faces Long
Road Ahead, at http:llwww.cnn.com/TECHIlO/04/privacy.fuss.idglindex.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2000). ToySmart, the mostly Disney-owned online toy retailer based
in Waltham, Massachusetts, filed for bankruptcy protection and then tried to sell its
customer lists (complete with member's children's names, ages and e-mail addresses),
even after their TRUSTe blessed site promised it would never share that information
with a third party. Id. It is reassuring to note that TRUSTe is the entity that first
alerted the FTC to the bankrupt e-tailer's intent to sell its confidential customer data.
Id. As of October 4, 2000, the FTC has agreed to settle the suit filed against
ToySmart. Id.
97. Patricia S. Mugavero & Andrea Lee Negroni, Opportunities in Account
Aggregation, MORTGAGE BANKING, Dec. 1, 2000.
98. Id.
99. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 19.
100. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,646, 33,655
(2000).
101. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 19. This was demonstrated in July 2000 when
the FTC sued to prevent the bankrupt Internet toy seller ToySmart from selling its
confidential customer data. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
102. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 19.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 - 1693r (1994).
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provides a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and
responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer (EFT)
systems."°  The EFTA is implemented by the Fed's Regulation
E,"o and includes language specifying which regulator has
authority over each category of institution and stating that any
category not expressly listed falls under FTC jurisdiction."6
Appendix B of Regulation E uses the same explanations of
responsibility, concluding "all others not covered above" fall under
the jurisdiction of the FTC.1°
No definitive ruling has been issued on how Regulation E
will apply to third party Internet aggregators when aggregation
evolves to incorporate EFT capabilities." The Fed has taken the
general position that an aggregator would be a financial institution
for purposes of Regulation E."° In an effort to determine the
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1994). As of now, data aggregation sites provide only
information; they have not yet jumped onto the transaction bandwagon, but pundits
indicate that it is a natural next step. See Leuchter, supra note 11, at 28.
105. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2000). Types of transfers covered by EFTA and Regulation
E include transfers initiated through an ATM, point-of-sale terminal, automated
clearinghouse, telephone bill-payment plan, or remote banking program. Electronic
Funds Transfer, 65 Fed. Reg. 40,061 (June 29,2000). The Act and regulation require
disclosure of terms and conditions of an EFT service; documentation of electronic
transfers by means of terminal receipts and periodic account statements; limitations
on consumer liability for unauthorized transfers; procedures for error resolution; and
certain rights related to preauthorized electronic transfers. Id. The Act and
regulation also prescribe restrictions on the unsolicited issuance of ATM cards and
other access devices. Id.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o(c) (1994).
107. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 app. B (2000). Many non-bank aggregators skirt Regulation
E liability by transferring funds via paper check, rather than electronically-the
regulatory trigger. Michele Heller, Regs Not Keeping Up with Web Aggregation, AM.
BANKER, July 11, 2000, at 1. Two of the reasons aggregators might use paper checks:
it ensures that merchants lacking wire transfer capabilities have the ability to be paid,
and they avoid Regulation E. Id. (citing Mr. John Jin Lee, Wells Fargo Bank vice
president and assistant general counsel).
108. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 20. Most commentators believe that any
aggregator through which a consumer can initiate an EF would likely be subject to
Regulation E. Id. Even before aggregation evolves to incorporate EFT capabilities, a
serious question exists regarding where liability will fall if fraudulent transactions
occur because of account access information provided by the consumer to the
aggregator. Id. Among other possibilities, the Federal Reserve suggests that,
depending on the exact circumstances surrounding a specific unauthorized EFT,
liability might be found to lie with the financial institution, with the third party
aggregator, or with the consumer who had given the aggregator access to the
consumer's account. Id.
109. Electronic Funds Transfer, 65 Fed. Reg. 40,061. Typically, only one access
device is contemplated to initiate an EFT to or from a consumer's account. Star
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applicability of Regulation E, the Federal Reserve issued a request
for comment on "the implications of a determination that
aggregators are or are not financial institutions for purposes of
Regulation E..... ."' The Board has specifically requested
comments on the following:
* Are aggregators providing or planning to
provide bill-payment or other EFT services (in
addition to information services)?
* To what extent do agreements exist between
aggregators and account-holding institutions,
governing matters such as procedures for access to
information and for electronic transfers?
* Additionally, what are the implications of a
determination that aggregators are or are not
financial institutions for purposes of Regulation E
generally or under §205.14.11
The Credit Union National Association, Inc.'s (CUNA)
comment letter on Regulation E was typical of comments received
and stressed three key points." First, the letter urged the Fed to
consider financial aggregators to be financial institutions subject to
Regulation E."3 CUNA's letter also expressed concern about
credit union members giving their Personal Identification
Survey, supra note 3, at 20. Nevertheless, if a consumer enters a security code issued
by the aggregator to access information on the aggregator's web site and the
consumer initiates an EFT using a security code provided by the account-holding
institution, the security code issued by the aggregator arguably meets the definition
of an "access device." Id. The Fed has also said that if a consumer gives the
aggregator access to his or her financial information and the aggregator is not a
financial institution, and a transaction takes place, the consumer's account may
assume liability for the transfer. Id. Independent Community of Bankers
Association President Thomas J. Sheehan takes the position that aggregators
"indirectly hold consumer accounts by virtue of being entrusted by the consumer
with access codes to the consumer's account." Id.
110. Electronic Funds Transfer, 65 Fed. Reg. 40,061. The request was sent June
23, 2000 and comments were due August 31, 2000. A final ruling is due by the end of
2001. Id.
111. Id.
112. Technology News Briefs: CUNA offers Reg E Comments, CREDIT UNION J.,




Numbers to financial aggregators and the potential for abuse."'
Finally, the letter urged the Fed to propose "rigorous encryption,
network security, and fraud detection system guidelines for screen
scrapers." 15
In discussing possible avenues of regulation for
aggregators, one cannot ignore the possibility of state level
regulation. States presently license a wider array of financial
service providers than does the federal government."6
Aggregators are not yet licensed under existing state laws, but
other financial service providers that provide very similar services
are subject to state licensing in connection with those activities."
Some states could interpret current money transmitter laws to
include those who receive payment instructions that result in the
transmission of money, and not just those who actually receive
money.' If states get into the act, aggregators could find
themselves subject to license fees, background investigations,
surety bonds, minimum net worth requirements, annual record
keeping and reporting requirements, periodic examinations by
state regulators, fee limitations and criminal and civil penalties for
noncompiance.9
V. AGGREGATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTION CONCERNS
Consumer fears concerning the inappropriate use of
personal information could quickly turn into distrust of the
financial institution itself." In a survey of consumer attitudes
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting the comment letter from CUNA). It also urged that guidance by
the board should also protect the account holding institution form liability resulting
from an aggregator's activities. Id.
116. Mugavero & Negoroni, supra note 97.
117. Id. For example, several states regulate companies engaged in money
transmission. Id. At the simplest level, money transmitters receive money from one
party to pay another party. Id. Aggregators are distinguishable from money
transmitters because rather than receiving funds, they receive instructions from a
customer and then instruct the customer's bank to transfer funds. Id. Aggregators
have the ability to make traditional money transmitters obsolete, and states may not
allow a regulated industry to be displaced by an unregulated one. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Vartanian & Ledig, supra note 2.
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about Internet privacy, 2' respondents who were asked specifically
about their online privacy said they were most worried about web
sites providing their personal information to others and collecting
information about them without their knowledge."i Seventy-one
percent of those surveyed said it is absolutely essential that
companies ask consumers' permission before using their personal
information for any purpose other than the one originally given."
Ninety-one percent of those polled trust companies somewhat or
completely to follow their posted privacy policies. 4 Consumers
are most worried about the security of their financial information
online, with 53% afraid their financial or other sensitive
information may be stolen during transmission to a web site."
Seventy-four percent thought the protection of financial asset
information was most important.""
To create a higher level of consumer confidence, financial
institutions and aggregators need to address security, privacy, and
fraud protection."a2 An aggregator's need to store customer
authentication information within its computer system is one of
121. To measure consumer attitudes about Internet privacy, security and
children's online safety, the National Consumers League, with the support of Dell,
commissioned a survey that was conducted by Harris Interactive in August 2000.
Press Release, National Consumers League, Online Americans More Concerned
about Privacy Than Health Care, Crime, and Taxes (Oct. 2000) (available at
http://www.natlconsumersleague.orglnews2000.htm#October) (last visited Feb. 23,
2001) (linked directly to Harris Poll). Harris Poll Online conducted the survey within
the United States, from August 30-31, 2000, and surveyed 2,810 adults. Id. The
national sample was designed to be representative of adults over eighteen who are
online. Id. The survey weighted figures for age within gender, race, education,
region, and income where necessary to bring them in line with their actual
proportions in the population. Id.
122. Id. Sixty-four percent were 'very concerned' about web sites providing
information to other organizations without the consumer's knowledge, and 59% were
'very concerned' that web sites would collect information about them without their
knowledge.
123. Id.
124. Id. Ninety-nine percent of respondents had seen a privacy notice or other
explanation of how personal information collected by that site would be used, but
only 20% always read the information in the privacy notice and 49% read it
sometimes. Id. Forty-eight percent wanted web sites to explain exactly how their
sensitive information is secured in transmission and storage. Id.
125. Id. Thirty-five percent of the respondents were very concerned that someone
could get into the company database and steal customer information, while 47% were
very concerned about receiving a virus. Id.
126. Id.
127. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 8.
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the biggest concerns to financial institutions." Even the most
powerful security precautions can be subject to foul play."9 In
February 2000, federal and industry security teams warned that
malicious codes embedded in Internet links and e-mails could
allow hackers to capture any information entered by the user." In
June 2000, America Online faced the possibility that hackers had
penetrated the company security system and obtained subscribers'
credit card numbers.' If a hacker successfully breached a web
aggregator's security, "consumers could face losses far greater than
a single credit card number and expiration date."'32 Additionally,
financial institutions and third-party aggregators have not agreed
on a common set of control points to form a dependable audit
trail, which would help track a fraudulent transaction.'33
128. Id.; Renee Boucher Ferguson, Data Aggregation Poses Risks, EWEEK, Oct. 2,
2000, at 44.
129. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 21. Catherine Allen, chief executive officer of
BITS, says that "if a master computer hacker, working either within a third-party
aggregator or alone, wanted to badly enough, he or she could conceivably gain access
to account and authentication information, log directly on to financial institutions'
web sites, and make off with funs from a multitude of accounts. And because there
currently is no audit trail, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to trace such
transactions." Id.
130. Diane Frank, Hackers Tampering with Internet, E-mail Links, at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECHIcomputing/O2/08/email.hacks.idglindex.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2001).
131. AOL Says Hackers May Have Stolen Credit Card Numbers, at
http:lwww.cnn.com/2000TECHlcomputingl06/17/aol.hacker.01/index.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2001).
132. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 8. The methods currently available to
aggregators for authenticating customers' identities is also a concern. Id. Financial
institutions must use multiple authentication processes and tools when opening a new
account for a new customer; web aggregators, however, currently base authentication
decisions exclusively on information provided to them online by their presumptive
customers. Id.
133. Id. Financial institutions provide personal I.D. numbers (PINs) to their
customers so that those consumers can access their accounts online. Vartanian &
Ledig, supra note 2. It is clear enough that the information belongs to the customer,
but is the PIN a blanket authority for the consumer to access (and allow others to
access) their account information, or may the provider impose terms and conditions
limiting the purposes for which the PIN may be used and the parties who may use it?
Id. Mr. Vartanian and Mr. Ledig of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, & Jacobson cite
America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d. 244 (E.D. Va. 1998) for the
possibility that the PINs can be limited in this way. Id. America Online fied suit
against a company sending unwanted e-mail to its members in violation of the
conditions of use of the service. Id. The Court found this breach was a violation of
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. IV 1998). Id.
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Direct data feed access by the aggregators challenges a
financial institution's computer system because it places a huge
demand on that system, which can have a detrimental effect on the
system's speed and could even cause a system to crash."aM Directly
feeding data from a financial institution to an aggregator is less
subject to fraud than screen scraping because it has an added level
of security.35 There is an impetus to create a common language for
direct feed. In January 2001, a group of technology companies led
by IBM introduced an Internet standard that gives companies a
common platform for exchanging information about customers.'3
Companies that join the Customer Profile Exchange Network
(CPExchange) will be able to swap customer names, addresses,
phone numbers, and ages, plus harder-to-track data like
transaction information and purchases."
As discussed earlier in this Note," a financial institution
that changes the design of its web site or screen can create
problems with inaccurate or incomplete data collected by screen
scraping aggregators."9 Exacerbating problems with accuracy,
many aggregators collect account data once a day, which means
that the information available at their web sites is updated only
once every twenty-four hours." Although some institutions aim to
134. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 9. Bielski, supra note 7, at 47. Currently, the
population of web aggregation at any given institution is not great enough for this to
be a real concern. Id. Moreover, the aggregators and banks accomplish direct feeds
overnight in batches, when demand on computer systems is relatively low. Id. at 9-
10. It is not clear what will happen as the number of aggregation customers grows
into the millions. Id. at 10.
135. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. Because direct feed access
requires a financial institutions' full knowledge and cooperation, this method actually
may expose participating financial institutions to greater liability than screen-
scraping. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 10.
136. The Tech Scene: A New Privacy Flash Point, Courtesy of IBM?, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 3,2001, at 1.
137. Star Survey, supra note 3. The exchange is in the experimentation and
demonstration phase, and its organizers have not said when they expect to have it
fully up and running. Id. First Union is involved in the development of CPExchange,
and some have questioned whether bank involvement violates GLBA. Sen. Shelby
Questions First Union's Involvement in Data-Sharing, B.N.A. BANKING DAILY, Dec.
11, 2000.
138. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.




impede screen scrapers by reconfiguring their web sites, 4' most
changes are made simply to accommodate more information or
otherwise enhance customer convenience. Regardless of the
motivation for change, the aggregator's site is inaccurate."
In addition to technological concerns and worries about
third parties, financial institutions need to worry about data
aggregator behavior and the taint of misbehavior by other
financial institutions. Potential aggregator misconduct is reflected
in reports that a senior executive at Wells Fargo was warned by
several screen scrapers that if the bank failed to cooperate, the
aggregators "would be happy to introduce shared customers to
banks that would."'" Financial institutions will have to vigorously
condemn the mere appearance that it improperly shared customer
information. FleetBoston Financial Corporation is under fire from
Minnesota Attorney General Mike Hatch for allegedly sharing its
customers' home mortgage account numbers, contact numbers,
and other personal information with telemarketing companies.' 5
With public awareness of privacy issues and the foibles of
its human operators at an all time high, a financial institution may
react with guarantees of maximum protection on its website.
However, at least one writer for the magazine Web Finance thinks
that would be an overreaction. 146 Celia Santander argues that the
worst possible approach is to promise too much and deliver too
141. Bielski, supra note 7, at 47. There is some interesting software by Vyou, Inc.
that allegedly "foil[s] account aggregators by prohibiting them from taking customer
information from bank [w]eb sites ...." Megan Ptacek, Aggregator-Blocking Service
May be Blocked by Bad Timing, AM. BANKER, Feb. 16,2001, at 1. Since banks seem
to be adopting aggregation services and accepting screen-scraping as a fact of life,
Vyou's success may hinge on how much anti-aggregation sentiment banks are still
harboring; alternatively, financial institutions may be able to find a profitable use for
the technology by keeping illegitimate screen-scrapers away from a bank's web site.
Id.
142. Star Survey, supra note 3, at 9.
143. Id.
144. John Switzer, Scraping By: Banks are the New Victims in the Privacy Wars,
BANK INv. MKTG., Oct. 3,2000.
145. Robert Julavits, In Brief- Suit: Fleet Violated Own Privacy Policy, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 29,2000, at 17. Fleet has vowed to fight his suit and tersely refuted the
charges as inflammatory and inaccurate. Robert Julavits, Fleet to Tough out Minn.
Suit, AM. BANKER, Jan. 2,2001, at 1.
146. Celia Santander, Web-Site Privacy Policies Aren't Created Equal, WEB FIN.,
Dec. 11, 2000,2000 WL 4044528.
2001]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
little by making promises in a privacy policy that are logistically or
technically impossible to keep.' In the recent Toysmart.com case,
the FTC filed suit against Toysmart.com for violating its own web
site privacy policy, which stated that personally identifiable
information would 'never' be sold to a third party."  Toysmart's
attempted sale was in the context of bankruptcy and demonstrated
how far the FTC would go to enforce the terms of a consumer web
site privacy policy.' 9  Regulatory enforcement aside, any
commerce site subscribing to seal organizations such as TRUSTe
can be open to breach of contract claims under the terms of such
programs."'
VI. CONCLUSION:
Customers want aggregation so long as concerns about
security, fraud, and privacy are appropriately addressed. Financial
institutions are in a good position to address those concerns while
providing a service under rising demand. If financial institutions
decide to continue fighting the aggregation trend, others
organizations will provide the service-and keep the customers.
As enhancements such as investment advice, portfolio
management, and cross-selling are added to aggregation service,
the opportunities for increased revenues from aggregation are
likely to increase as well.
If a financial institution decides to become an aggregator, it
must consider and evaluate the risks and methods. The decision-
makers must evaluate the technological demands on their system,
as well as what kind of aggregator it wants to be-direct feed only
or primarily screen scraping. As a financial institution, banks must
examine regulations as they apply to banks, and must also take
147. Id.
148. Id. Commissioner Orson Swindle explained simply that "never really means
never"- a warning to web site privacy policy drafters to say exactly what you mean.
Id.
149. Id. The FTC has a philosophy of full and plain disclosure supported by literal
interpretation. See, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on
Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace, at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/testimonyprivacy.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2001).
150. Santander, supra note 146.
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appropriate measures to assure themselves that the aggregation
service provider follows applicable regulations. It appears that
aggregators, whether independent or working with a financial
institution, will fall under some federal regulations such as GLBA.
It does not appear as if the financial institution will have to look
only to the contract to enforce those regulations; they will be able
to ask for FTC enforcement.
This Note does not propose that federal regulatory
oversight of aggregators to the same degree of federal regulatory
oversight of financial institutions is in the best interests of financial
institutions or their customers. First, the enforceability of such
oversight would be catch-as-catch-can at best. Second, the
expense of enforcement would be horrendous. Finally, such
regulation could have a chilling effect on competition and the
development of new technologies that may help banks work
better, faster, and cheaper. Requiring the same kind of auditing
banks must endure does not seem to meet the same level of cost-
benefit. Enacting more regulations for aggregators, only leads to
further regulation of the banking industry. The FTC umbrella for
enforcement would seem the most cost-efficient manner of
enforcement. It is a proven system that relies on consumer and
banker vigilance. Requiring aggregators to abide by privacy
regulations should not dampen innovation and should lead to
greater customer confidence and satisfaction.
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